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Financialization, creative accounting and the 8.¶V productivity crisis 
 
 
Background 
 
Researchers observing a link between the growth of financialization and falling 
productivity in major economies highlight two causes. A first focuses on the growing 
importance of agency theory arguments in the late 1970s and how this changed 
corporate governance priorities in large firms (Lazonick & 2¶6XOOLYDQ 2000). According 
to this argument, stock-based remuneration packages aligned PDQDJHUV¶ interests 
with those of owners (Fligstein, 2001, Lazonick, 2003), leading to zero sum 
distributional struggles: firms cut labour costs and investment to increase shareholder 
distributions in the short term, which reduced rates of productivity and international 
competitiveness (Fligstein and Shin, 2004; Lazonick 2010; Lazonick & 2¶6XOOLYDQ 
2000; Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013). A second argues that the search for profit in 
non-financial firms encouraged them to switch capital from productive to financial 
investments (Christophers 2017; Dumenil & Levy 2001; Krippner 2005), leading to 
falling productivity and accumulation over the longer term (Orhangazi, 2008; 
Stockhammer 2004, 2007).  
 
Concerns about the negative effects of shareholder-value pressures on productivity 
have spilled over into the mainstream. Within policy circles, Andrew Haldane, Chief 
Economist at the Bank of England, criticized the high pay-out ratios from internal funds 
(Haldane 2015, p.12), as well as the use of excessive discount rates which 
disincentivise investment (Ball & Haldane 2018). Larry Fink, CEO at Blackrock, argued 
against the µEX\EDFNV or dividend LQFUHDVHV¶ that led companies to, µXQGHULQYHVW« in 
innovation, skilled workforces or essential capital expenditures necessary to sustain 
long-term JURZWK¶ Financial journalists like Martin Wolf and John Kay as well as 
prominent business school researchers (Mayer 2012; Stout 2012) have echoed such 
views: that financialization and the pursuit of shareholder value is leading to corporate 
short-termism which is bad for investment, productivity and growth.  
 
However financialized processes may negatively influence productivity through 
different channels. There are, for example, many contemporary examples of 
intangible-asset-heavy, low-productivity firms who maintain extraordinarily high 
dividend payouts aided by creative but controversial accounting practices (see BEIS 
2019). Changes to accounting rules may, therefore, have made it easier for managers 
to create returns to shareholders through forms of financial engineering and other 
creative accounting practices (Leaver et al 2020). This may lead managers to satisfice 
under conditions of time and resource constraints; switching their efforts from the 
µGLIILFXOW VWXII¶ of exercising skill and judgement in the selection of investment 
opportunities or improvement in technique, to the simpler, low-risk practice of hiring 
law and accounting experts to advise on the representation of their annual accounts.  
 
This report reflects on the co-incidence of creative accounting practices and low 
productivity outcomes in a context of financialization. It considers the following 
proposition: that if returns to creative accounting are high, they µFrowd RXW¶ investment-
led, productivity-enhancing alternatives for shareholder value creation. 
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Context: The Financialization Of Accounting 
 
Creative accounting has always been around, but the recent high-profile failures of 
Carillion, Interserve and others highlight a particular form: the realisation of large 
amounts of µEURXJKW IRUZDUG¶ income and the maintenance of optimistic intangible 
asset valuations which swell distributable reserves and help management pay out 
large dividends, before large impairments put the companies into administration (see 
Leaver 2018; 2019). 
 
This kind of creative accounting was made possible as accounting rules and practices 
financialized ± defined as, µWKH integration of valuation techniques derived from 
financial economics into accounting measurements and the rise of definitions of value 
derived from capital markets and capital market-based H[FKDQJH¶ (Mennicken & 
Power 2015). The influence of the discipline of economics on accounting led to a shift 
from a historic cost accounting regime which records items on the basis of actual 
transactions, to a market-based fair value regime which values items on a net present 
value basis ± i.e. the PDUNHW¶V best estimate of current item values based on 
expectations of the discounted future cashflows they will generate. This emphasis on 
expectations of future economic states introduced greater subjectivity into the 
valuation process, handing managers more discretion to report the items that underlie 
shareholder value creation and trigger their bonuses. A series of scathing reports on 
the quality of audit (BEIS & WPC 2018; BEIS 2019; Competition & Markets Authority 
2019; Kingman et al 2018; Leaver et al 2020) raise questions about the robustness of 
current audit practice in constraining excessive discretionary valuations that benefit 
management.  
 
Approach and core concepts 
 
The financialization of accounting is our focus. Our approach is therefore grounded in 
an understanding of the firm as a construct of accounting and law, rather than an 
aggregator of competences or transaction minimizing vehicle. Our analytical approach 
means we focus on certain features of law and accounting which may be new territory 
for researchers of productivity or even financialization and which require explanation: 
 
i) Distributable reserves: contrary to lay understandings, dividends and other forms of 
shareholder distributions are not paid from current profits of the consolidated group, 
EXWIURPWKHµGLVWULEXWDEOHUHVHUYHV¶RIDFRPSDQ\± normally the parent company in 
the case of a large, subsidiarised firm like our examples. Distributable reserves are 
a company's accumulated, realised profits (not previously used by distribution or 
capitalisation) less its accumulated, realised losses (not previously written off in a 
reduction or reorganisation of capital) (section 830(2), Companies Act 2006). The 
true objective of the financialized firm, therefore, is to increase its distributable 
potential through the maximization of its distributable reserves. We are therefore 
interesteGLQZKDWDFFRXQWLQJWUHDWPHQWVXQGHUOLHWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIDFRPSDQ\¶V
µGLVWULEXWDEOHUHVHUYHV¶EHFDXVHWKDWXOWLPDWHO\GHWHUPLQHVKRZPXFKFDQEHSDLG
out to shareholders. 
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ii) µ8QFHUWDLQ¶LWHPVWKHIDLUYDOXHUHJLPHLQWURGXFHVVXEMHFWLYLW\LQWRWKHYDOXDtion 
process (see section 2). The valuation of intangible assets, such as goodwill, 
therefore require some speculation as to what future cashflows will accrue to, and 
which future discount rates will apply to those assets. Goodwill, for example, is 
recorded as the difference between the purchase price paid by the acquirer and the 
IDLUYDOXHRIWKHWDUJHWILUP¶VDVVHWVSXUFKDVHG7KLVGLIIHUHQFHLVVXSSRVHGWR
UHSUHVHQWWKHPDUNHW¶VEHVWHVWLPDWHRIWKHH[SHFWHGGLVFRXQWHGIXWXUHFDVKIORZV
of those intangible assets (brand, reputation etc) not currently recognised on the 
WDUJHWILUP¶VEDODQFHVKHHW%XWWKHUHDUHUHODWLYHO\KLJKOHYHOVRIXQFHUWDLQW\LQWKLV
process. First, if a firm holds large amounts of goodwill on their balance sheet, this 
may simply represent overpayments for their acquisitions. Second, whilst that 
goodwill would be assessed for impairment periodically to see whether its market 
value had fallen below its holding value, there is considerable subjectivity exercised 
in this process. Managers can (and do) claim that an underperforming acquisition 
has generated synergistic gains elsewhere in the business and so should not be 
written-down. Third, the value of goodwill crucially depends on the firm remaining a 
going concern ± it has virtually no value at the point of company insolvency. For 
WKHVHUHDVRQVZHFODVVLI\JRRGZLOODQGRWKHUDFFRXQWLQJLWHPVOLNHLWDVµXQFHUWDLQ¶
EHFDXVHWKHLUYDOXDWLRQUHOLHVRQWKHH[HUFLVHRIPDQDJHPHQWV¶VXEMHFWLYH
MXGJHPHQW)LUPVZKHUHµXQFHUWDLQ¶DVVHWVPDNHXSD large proportion of total 
assets may be riskier, and there are many contemporary examples of corporate 
failure from Carillion to Thomas Cook which would indicate this is so. Those 
XQFHUWDLQDVVHWVDOVRSRWHQWLDOO\µSURS-XS¶GLVWULEXWDEOHUHVHUYHVDJRRGZill 
impairment, for example, would normally lead to a reduction in retained earnings of 
the group (and parent, if the value of subsidiaries were also impaired - but see 
caveat below in (iii)), and that could restrict what is distributed to shareholders. 
 
iii) Parent vs. Group accounts: large listed companies post two sets of accounts in 
their annual report: parent and group accounts. A parent company is a company 
that has a controlling interest in another company, giving it control of its operations. 
Its assets are largely made up of the holding value of its subsidiaries. A corporate 
group or group of companies is a collection of parent and subsidiary corporations 
that function as a single economic entity through a common source of control. A 
group balance sheet presents a composite picture of parent, subsidiaries and joint 
concerns. There is (or at least should be) a reasonably strong symmetry between 
parent and group accounts. However ± and crucially for the purposes of this report 
- dividends are paid from the distributable reserves of the parent company. 
Examples where the parent company has a much stronger net asset position or a 
larger pool of retained earnings (normally a proxy for its distributable reserves) may 
therefore be an indicator of creative accounting practices. They are, then, an issue 
to which we direct attention in this report.  
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Report Structure 
 
This report examines the creative accounting practices and productivity performance 
in six companies; three each from the quoted UK pharmaceutical and water sectors. 
These sectors were chosen because the pharmaceutical sector is often considered to 
be a dynamic, research and development intensive, high-productivity sector which 
reinvests profits into the search for better medicines; although recent research 
suggests a sharp productivity slowdown (ONS 2018) The water sector, in contrast, 
involves companies which are quasi regional monopolies and are one of the most 
important sectors to have experienced a marked downturn in productivity post-crisis 
(Riley et al 2018), yet have evidence of high-dividend payouts (Yearwood 2018). 
Examining two such contrasting sectors allows us to draw out differences and 
commonalities.  
 
To achieve this goal we use forensic accounting methods to examine, over a period of 
eight years: a) changing levels of investment in various asset forms b) the accounting 
treatment of items core to determining a ILUP¶V distributable funds  c) changing levels 
of employees and asset productivity  d) the relation between debt and dividends at 
company level over the same periods, and e) the reliability of tax reporting in those 
organisations as an indication of the likely prevalence of tax avoidance. We also noted 
overall financial performance using conventional measures of growth.  
 
This paper continues in four further parts. First, we explain our sample election. Then 
we explain the data approach adopted and how that data is used to appraise various 
measures relating to productivity and financial engineering, for which purpose it was 
intended. Thereafter we note our results. We conclude with suggestions on the 
interpretation of our findings to date and suggestions as to further research that would 
be beneficial.  
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Research sample 
 
Our sample companies had to be large companies to ensure some degree of 
comparability. They also needed to be listed firms because accounting disclosure is 
less substantial in privately held companies. Applying these criteria, there are four 
pharmaceutical companies in the FTSE 350 but one (Dechra Pharmaceuticals plc) is 
primarily engaged in the supply of veterinary products and as such is not directly 
comparable with the other three, which then formed the sample for this research. They 
are: 
 
a. GlaxoSmithKline plc (GSK) 
b. AstraZenecca plc (AZN) 
c. Hikma Pharmaceuticals plc (Hikma) 
 
There are three water companies in the FTSE 350 quoted on the London Stock 
Exchange. They are: 
d. United Utilities Group plc (UU) 
e. Severn Trent plc (ST) 
f. Pennon Group plc (Pennon) 
 
These companies form the basis for the work undertaken on this sector. 
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Methodology 
 
The published financial statements for each company have been summarised for the 
years 2011 to 2018, excluding 2011 for Pennon Group plc where suitable data was not 
available: the company was created in its current form in 2012. Database sources 
were not suitable for this purpose as they provide insufficient data granularity on key 
issues like tax, current assets and current liabilities: extraction from primary sources 
has, then, taken place.  
 
We sought to extract data that presented us with information about: 
 
a. Trading performance; 
b. Tax due and paid; 
c. Employee numbers and their remuneration; 
d. Cash flow; 
e. Group balance sheets; 
f. Parent company balance sheets; 
g. Distributions to shareholders and other financiers. 
 
To do that, we analysed data from accounts between 2011-18 on the following 
accounting items: 
 
a. Turnover; 
b. Inflation adjusted turnover; 
c. Gross profit; 
d. Inflation adjusted gross profit; 
e. Operating profit; 
f. Inflation adjusted operating profit; 
g. Finance costs; 
h. Dividends; 
i. Net profit before tax; 
j. Inflation adjusted net profit before tax; 
k. Depreciation; 
l. Amortisation; 
m. EBITDA; 
n. Inflation adjusted EBITDA; 
o. EBIT; 
p. The tax charge and its components; 
q. Gross wage costs including employment related overheads such as social security and 
pension costs; 
r. Net wage costs; 
s. Number of employees; 
t. Average pay; 
u. Inflation adjusted average wage; 
v. Investment in tangible fixed assets 
w. Investment in intangible fixed assets; 
x. Investment in assets of uncertain market value e.g. deferred taxation and derivatives; 
y. Investment in inventories; 
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z. Trade debtors; 
aa. Other debtors; 
bb. Cash balances; 
cc. Trade creditors; 
dd. Borrowing, both short and long term; 
ee. Other creditors 
ff. Provisions and other uncertain liabilities such as hedging and derivatives; 
gg. Deferred taxation; 
hh. Share capital and related reserves e.g. the share premium account; 
ii. Retained earnings; 
jj. Other reserves; 
kk. Minority interests; 
ll. Similar balance sheet data for the parent company, where appropriate. Parent 
company profit and loss data is not consistently available and so has not been 
collected.  
 
Productivity data was then prepared in addition to indicators included in the above 
information: 
 
a. Labour cost productivity in proportion to: 
x Turnover; 
x EBITDA; 
x net profit before tax; 
This data has been prepared in 2018 prices; 
b. Individual employee productivity as expressed by: 
x Turnover per employee; 
x EBITDA pe employee; 
x Net profit per employee; 
This data has also been prepared in 2018 prices.  
c. Tangible assets per employee in inflation adjusted prices; 
d. Intangible assets per employee in inflation adjusted prices. 
 
In addition, financial productivity was tested using the following ratios: 
 
e. Tangible asset productivity, measured by turnover to tangible assets; 
f. Intangible asset productivity, measured by turnover to tangible assets; 
g. Inventory productivity as measured by the ratio of inventory to turnover; 
h. Trade and other debtor management as measured as a ratio to turnover; 
 
Costs of financing were also considered: 
 
i. Dividend ratios to available net profit before tax in the group; 
j. Interest ratios and costs are calculated including cover and implied costs; 
k. The gearing ratio is reviewed. 
 
Finally at this stage, issues relating to accounting quality were addressed. We first 
examined assets of uncertain value. Assets of uncertain value are defined as those 
which are unlikely to be of any value unless the entity is a going concern; or where 
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their value is hard to determine by reference to any external market indicator (see 
section 3ii). Liabilities may also be uncertain by this latter measure. Assets and 
liabilities of this nature may be in categories such as trade debtors and other 
receivables, but for our purposes the focus of attention is upon those reported 
categories within financial statements where uncertainty is most likely to exist, 
including goodwill and other intangible assets, deferred taxation, derivatives, 
provisions and pension fund assets and liabilities These items were appraised as 
follows:  
 
l. What proportion of the total assets of the company are of uncertain value? 
m. What proportion of the total liabilities of the company are of uncertain value? 
n. What proportion of the net assets of the company are of uncertain value? 
 
Consideration of the availability of reserves for distribution by the parent was the next 
focus of concern in this category, since there have been persistent doubts raised on 
this issue (see BEIS 2019; LAPFF 2018). In particular, we gave focus to the disparity 
between reported group reserves and the reserves reported by the parent company. 
This is relevant because if group reserves are negative but parent reserves are 
positive, this may be an indicator of creative accounting practices in a context where 
positive reserves are required to pay out dividends. To address this issue the following 
issues were addressed: 
 
o. Did the distributable profits of the parent company exceed those of the group, and in 
what proportion? 
p. What was ratio of dividends to available reserves of: 
x The group; 
x The parent company? 
q. How did these proportions change over time? 
 
The question of differing rewards was also addressed to indicate distributions & 
financial stress: 
 
r. What was the ratio of interest paid to EBIT and how did this change over time? 
s. What was the ratio of dividends to wage costs? 
t. What was the ratio of interest to wage costs? 
u. What was the ratio of total finance costs (interest plus dividends) to wage costs? 
 
Finally, questions with regard to tax reporting were addressed: 
 
v. How large was the variation between the expected current tax rate and the actual 
current tax rate? 
w. How large were the annual restatements of tax liability and were they consistently 
negative, implying that successful tax avoidance was taking place? 
x. What was the scale of deferred tax restatement over the period and was trend 
significant? 
 
The above measures were prepared for all companies for all years. We then broke 
these measures down into four categories: 
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1. Financial performance; 
2. Productivity; 
3. Distributions & financial stress; 
4. Reliability of financial reporting. 
 
Financial statements of a quoted company are, according to the International Financial 
Reporting Standard Foundation, primarily intended to assist µH[LVWLQJ and potential 
investors, lenders and other creditors in making decisions relating to providing 
resources to the HQWLW\¶ (IFRS 2018, A17). Data on performance, productivity, stress 
and reliability can, however, be derived from the information in financial statements, 
even if this is not the primary purpose for its production. Our approach aims to identify 
both i) trends (in how many years is there an improvement in performance?) and ii) 
raw data (what do the particular levels evident in this data tell us about the firm?) on 
these four criteria. 
 
To appraise trend data, tables of the following sort have been created for all the 
variables: 
 
Table 1 ± example data table 
 
 
 
Source: financial statements ending in the years noted for the entities noted 
 
The table tests a very simply measure in each case: whether a variable has increased 
in value or not from one year to the next. The number of years when this happens is 
then calculated and that total is then divided by the number of years used for sampling 
(the µ6FRUH¶ column). The direction of testing is dependent on the assumption as to 
whether an increase in a value is desirable, or not. We then rank trend results to 
indicate a) declining productivity, or b) increased accounting uncertainty or c) declining 
reporting quality. This was done using the following methodology: 
 
i. To interpret results, and to indicate a ranking, these trend results were first averaged 
for the indicator group and then subjected to a scoring process. Results of less than 
30% were awarded a score of 1; the score was then increased by 1 for each 10% band 
(i.e. 30.01% - 40% is 2) with all results over 70% awarded a score of six.  
ii. These marks were then averaged for each company to create a ranking score. 
 
In each case a low mark is an indicator of concern.  
 
 
There are weaknesses in such simplicity: the resulting data is not testing the scale of 
change, for example (although this does emerge from the industry trend aggregates). 
Turnover 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Average Score
ά'm ά'm ά'm ά'm ά'm ά'm ά'm ά'm ά'm Years in test
AstraZeneca plc 20,944               17,673           16,455           16,082           16,144           16,716           17,514           16,442           17,246           3/7 7
GlaxoSmithKline plc 27,387               26,431           26,505           23,006           23,923           27,889           30,186           30,821           27,019           5/7 7
Hikma Pharmaceuticals plc 572                      701                   874                   902                   941                   1,417              1,509              1,541              1,057              7/7 7
Total pharmaceuticals 48,903               44,805           43,834           39,990           41,008           46,022           49,209           48,803           45,322           3/7 7
Pennon Group plc -                        1,233              1,201              1,321              1,357              1,352              1,353              1,396              1,152              4/6 6
United Utilities Group plc 1,513                  1,565              1,636              1,705              1,720              1,730              1,704              1,736              1,664              6/7 7
Severn Trent pc 1,711                  1,771              1,831              1,857              1,801              1,787              1,638              1,694              1,761              4/7 7
Total water companies 3,224                  4,569              4,668              4,883              4,878              4,869              4,695              4,826              4,577              4/7 7
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But what it does do is establish whether there are persistent patterns in the data, or 
not.  
 
To add more details, we also created tables which show the raw data in each year, 
where relevant. In the measures of distributions and the quality of financial reporting 
this is particularly relevant. In these cases we strip out the impact of inflation, using the 
United .LQJGRP¶V retail prices index. This choice was considered appropriate, firstly, 
because this is the measure most familiar to those who work for a living and, secondly, 
because whilst many of the companies appraised have non-UK activity (and two - 
AstraZeneca and Hikma - actually report in US dollars1) all report to the UK stock 
exchange.  
 
  
                                                 
1
 US dollar values have been translated to sterling when required at official exchange rates published by the 8.¶V 
HM Revenue & Customs for the periods to which the financial statements relate. 
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Report Findings 
 
a. Financial performance 
 
Table 2 provides trend analysis and scores for financial performance in our six case 
companies. The variable tested is shown in the top row and the percentage number of 
years when change in trend improved according to those criteria is underneath the row 
headers: 
 
Table 2: Trend analysis - financial performance  
 
 
 
Source: $XWKRU¶V calculations based on financial statements ending in the years noted for the entities 
noted 
Note: for the underlying data, see the spreadsheet appendix. 
Note: water FRPSDQLHV¶ gross profit figures were not available through our database because they do 
not report this margin in their financial statements. 
 
As the ranking analysis of table 2 shows, AstraZeneca plc (AZN) delivered the 
weakest financial performance over the period: there was a decline in most measures 
in most years, and a decline in its inflation adjusted group net assets in every year of 
the period. That is a concern because net assets (total assets minus total liabilities) 
exactly match the stockholders' equity of a business and so are a measure of a ILUP¶s 
safety and security as well as performance.  
 
Smaller newcomers into their respective sectors - Hikma and Pennon ± appear to 
perform better across the spread of indicators in table 2. This may support findings 
elsewhere that part of the 8.¶V productivity problem may be the weak performance of 
larger incumbents (Schneider 2018) and their poor management relatively (Bloom and 
Van Reenen 2010). 
 
In terms of profit, table 3 shows a worrying decline in real EBITDA performance for 
AZN and GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and a flatlining of performance in water companies. 
Only Hikma emerges as having improved markedly since 2011, but even its EBITDA 
has been fairly static since 2013/2014. 
 
This worrying performance is reflected in the relative net asset positions of these firms. 
$=1¶V net assets more than halved from £28.2bn to £14.0bn between 2011-2018 
indicating a hollowing out of its equity support (table 4). GSK was also a weak 
performer by this measure, with group net assets falling from £10.6bn to £3.7bn over 
the same period. Water companies, however, modestly improved their aggregate net 
Financial performance data ta
Inflation 
adjusted 
turnover
Inflation 
adjusted 
EBITDA
Inflation 
adjusted net 
profit
Inflation 
adjusted net 
assets
Inflation 
adjusted 
parent 
company net 
assets
Gross profit 
margin
Operating 
profit margin
Net profit 
margin
Return on 
capital 
employed Average Ranking data
% % % % % % % % % %
AstraZeneca plc 2/7 3/7 2/7 0/7 2/7 2/7 2/7 2/7 2/7 1.9/7 1
GlaxoSmithKline plc 3/7 3/7 3/7 2/7 3/7 3/7 3/7 3/7 2/7 2.9/7 3
Hikma Pharmaceuticals plc 6/7 4/7 4/7 6/7 4/7 4/7 4/7 4/7 4/7 4.5/7 5
Total pharmaceuticals 3.7/7 3.4/7 3/7 2.7/7 3/7 3/7 3/7 3/7 2.7/7 3.1/7 3
Pennon Group plc 2/6 5/6 4/6 5/6 5/6 5/6 5/6 3/6 5.2/7 6
United Utilities Group plc 3/7 4/7 4/7 7/7 2/7 4/7 4/7 2/7 4/7 4
Severn Trent pc 3/7 2/7 3/7 3/7 3/7 3/7 4/7 3/7 3/7 3
Total water companies 2.8/7 3.9/7 3.9/7 5.3/7 3.5/7 4.2/7 4.6/7 2.8/7 4/7 4
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asset position between 2012-2018; although Severn Trent underperformed - ending 
2018 with a lower real asset position than in 2011; whilst Hikma Pharmaceuticals (HP) 
was the second-best performing company overall in terms of improvements in net 
asset position, albeit from a lower base.  
 
Table 5 shows the activity differences between pharma and water. Pharma firms, with 
a relatively lower capital requirement, have tended to generate higher returns on 
capital employed. Water companies, due to their heavy tangible fixed asset 
requirements, require larger amounts of capital. But the trends are clear: the big 
pharma companies of AZN and GSK have experienced a significant weakening in their 
ability to generate a return from a given set of capital inputs between 2011-2018. 
Water companies have experienced a modest decrease in that ability. +LNPD¶V 
performance has been more volatile, but shows an improvement in 2018 relative to 
2011.  
 
Table 3: Raw data - inflation adjusted EBITDA 
 
 
 
Table 4: Raw data - inflation adjusted net assets 
 
 
Table 5 ± Return on Capital Employed 
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b. Productivity measures 
 
Labour Productivity 
 
Productivity measures focus on the effective use of labour.  The following trend data is 
presented in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Trend data ± Employee productivity 
 
 
 
Source: $XWKRU¶V calculations based on financial statements ending in the years noted for the entities 
noted 
Note: for the underlying data, see the spreadsheet appendix, Analysis1 
 
There were differences between pharma and water companies in terms of inflation-
adjusted wage costs per employee. In GSK and Hikma real wage costs per employee 
rose in 6 of the 7 years between 2011-2018; although there was a large drop at GSK 
in 2014 (table 7). $=1¶V wage costs dropped in 2013, only to rise rapidly between 
2016-2018. In all three pharma companies, the average real wage was higher in 2018 
than in 2011. Distributions, which we will address later, did not require a reduction to 
wages for the incumbent workforce, contrary to the µ]HUR VXP¶ version of 
financialization (e.g. Lazonick & 2¶6XOOLYDQ 2000). In water, there was greater 
emphasis on employee cost control. United Utilities saw inflation-adjusted wage costs 
per employee fall in 5 of the 7 years in our sample, and by the end of 2018 the 
average real wage was £2,104 lower than in 2011. Wages were marginally lower at 
Severn Trent but marginally higher at Pennon in 2018 than in 2011/2012. 
 
Table 7: Raw data ± Average wage cost per employee 
 
 
 
The emphasis on labour cost control (and activity requirements for a lower labour 
input) meant that revenue to employee cost (table 8) and EBITDA to employee cost 
productivity performance (table 9) were higher for water than pharma companies 
overall. But the two large pharma companies showed patterns of labour productivity 
Employee productivity data ta
Average 
wages - 2018 
prices
Ratio 
turnover to 
employee 
cost
Ratio EBITDA 
to employee 
cost
Ratio net 
profit to 
employee 
cost
Inflation 
adjusted 
turnover per 
employee
Inflation 
adjusted 
EBITDA per 
employee
Inflation 
adjusted net 
profit per 
employee
Inflation 
adjusted 
tangible 
assets per 
employee
Inflation 
adjusted 
intangible 
assets per 
employee Average Ranking data
% % % % % % % % % %
AstraZeneca plc 3/7 1/7 2/7 2/7 0% 1/7 2/7 3/7 3/7 1.8/7 1
GlaxoSmithKline plc 6/7 2/7 3/7 3/7 4/7 3/7 3/7 4/7 3/7 3.5/7 3
Hikma Pharmaceuticals plc 6/7 3/7 4/7 4/7 5/7 4/7 4/7 3/7 2/7 4.1/7 4
Total pharmaceuticals 5/7 2/7 3/7 3/7 3/7 2.7/7 3/7 3.4/7 2.7/7 3.2/7 3
Pennon Group plc 3/6 2/6 5/6 4/6 2/6 4/6 4/6 4/6 4/6 4.1/7 4
United Utilities Group plc 2/7 3/7 5/7 4/7 3/7 4/7 4/7 4/7 6/7 3.6/7 4
Severn Trent pc 4/7 3/7 2/7 4/7 4/7 2/7 4/7 5/7 2/7 3.5/7 3
Total water companies 3.2/7 2.8/7 4.2/7 4.2/7 3.2/7 3.5/7 4.2/7 4.6/7% 4.2/7 3.7/7 4
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performance that echo their financial performance outlined above. EBITDA to 
employee cost fell from 3.31 to 1.31 in AZN and from 1.92 to 1.07 in GSK between 
2011-2018. AZN show a secular decline, with turnover per employee falling in every 
year. AZN fell precipitously from a position of strength. It was the best performing firm 
on a real EBITDA per employee basis in 2011, realising £307,987 (table 10). By 2018 
that figure had fallen to £111,187 per employee, lower than that realised by both 
United Utilities and Severn Trent and roughly on a par with Pennon Group. GSK also 
saw a marked deterioration in EBITDA per employee, falling from £125,395 in 2011 to 
£79,741 ± the second lowest score in our sample.  
 
The overall average scores for the sectors show a worrying decline in labour 
productivity performance in pharma and modest decline in labour productivity in water. 
This may indicate either that productivity growth was not an objective for management 
in either sector, or that if it was then they failed to achieve their goals.  
 
Table 8: Raw data ± Turnover to employee cost 
 
 
 
Table 9: Raw data ± EBITDA to employee cost 
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Table 10: Raw data ± EBITDA per employee 
 
 
 
Asset Productivity 
 
The productivity of financial assets is also an important consideration. The trend data 
for these measures is shown in Table 11. 
 
Table 11: Trend data - Asset productivity 
 
 
Source: $XWKRU¶V calculations based on financial statements ending in the years noted for the entities 
noted 
 
Pharma companies and water companies have very different asset structures. Pharma 
companies are R&D-intensive companies who produce patented (and occasionally 
other) drugs which compete in global markets, and are consequently intangible asset-
heavy (see Froud et al 2006). Water companies, on the other hand are quasi-local 
monopolies with activities which are tangible fixed asset heavy, because they require 
plants, water pipelines and other physical infrastructure.  
 
The asset productivity performance of these activities reflect these different activity 
bases and balance sheet structures. The more intangible-heavy pharma companies 
have much higher rates of turnover to tangible assets ± although in AZN and GSK 
there has ± again ± been a slowdown: for AZN turnover was 5.23x and for GSK 3.13x 
their tangible assets in 2011. This fell to 2.98x and 2.79x tangible assets respectively 
by 2018 (table 12). There were also modest declines over the same period across our 
three water companies.  
 
Pharma companies sell patented drugs ± so building a stock of intellectual property is 
part and parcel of operating in a knowledge-based activity. As table 13 shows 
intangible assets per employee are not only much higher in pharma than water, but 
Financial productivity data tab
Turnover to 
tangible 
assets
Turnover to 
intangible 
assets
Turnover to 
inventory
Turnover to 
trade and 
related 
debtors Average Ranking data
% % % % %
AstraZeneca plc 1/7 2/7 2/7 4/7 2.2/7 2
GlaxoSmithKline plc 3/7 4/7 3/7 4/7 3.5/7 3
Hikma Pharmaceuticals plc 4/7 4/7 4/7 3/7 3.8/7 4
Total pharmaceuticals 2.7/7 3.4/7 3/7 3.6/7 3.2/7 3
Pennon Group plc 1/6 3/6 0/6 1/6 1.5/7 1
United Utilities Group plc 2/7 1/7 6/7 4/7 3.2/7 3
Severn Trent pc 2/7 5/7 4/7 4/7 3.8/7 4
Total water companies 1.8/7 3.2/7 3.5/7 3.2/7 2.9/7 3
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have also increased significantly over our period of study (also contrast with table 10 
on EBITDA per employee). United Utilities and Severn have much higher turnover to 
intangibles ratios because their local monopoly status prevents large acquisitions that 
would boost their goodwill. Pennon is an outlier because it has 2-3 times the 
intangibles of the other two water firms (table 14). These intangibles arise from 
investment in what are termed µVHUYLFH concession DUUDQJHPHQWV¶ in its Viridor 
recycling business, which is one of the largest such operations in the UK.  
 
These µLQWDQJLEOH¶ assets are often thought to be the driver of productivity in the 
pharma sector. However, the data reveals that this growth of intangibles has not led to 
an improvement in financial performance and productivity. As table 14 and 15 show, 
returns to intangibles have fallen quite spectacularly in the two large pharma firms, 
AZN and GSK. EBITDA to intangible assets fell by over two thirds at AZN and around 
three fifths at GSK; Hikma has also experienced decline since 2013 after rapid 
improvements from 2011-2013 (table 15). Some of this may relate to the changing 
sectoral environment ± such as the slowing productivity of R&D investment (see Froud 
et al 2006). But it may also relate to the changing make-up of the intangibles on 
pharma firm balance sheets themselves. Intangibles may also include µJRRGZLOO¶ (see 
section 3ii) which is valued by the future income streams that are expected to accrue 
to things like brand, loyalty, reputation etc, but is effectively just an accounting plug 
when one company acquires another. Turnover and EBITDA to intangibles ratios 
decrease as intangibles grow at AZN and GSK. This is not unsurprising because 
goodwill is effectively a stock of future cashflows, whilst turnover is a flow measure. 
Part of the asset productivity puzzle in this specific case may be the result of an 
accounting artefact ± the non-amortization of goodwill which loads up the denominator 
in any Return on Asset calculation (see table 16). But placed alongside the financial 
performance and labour productivity performance above for GSK and AZN, there 
appears to be an inverse relation between the acquisition of goodwill and the decline 
of performance across a range of measures. It is unclear whether these M&A activities 
are defensive measures in worsening competitive environment - and that productivity 
performance would have been worse without those acquisitions. But it is also 
important not to discount the possibility that there are financial engineering benefits to 
multiple acquisitions but productivity diseconomies.  
 
What are those financial engineering benefits? Goodwill values are a capitalised 
measure of the DFTXLUHU¶V expected future cash flows at the point of acquisition. But 
the cash flows which then result from that acquisition are accounted for as income that 
increases assets (cash, accounts receivable, etc.) or equity (retained earnings) without 
incurring any corresponding costs or reductions to goodwill. The benefits of an 
acquisition are, in other words, monetized first as goodwill, then again as income. The 
resulting inflation of assets and equity are thus a form of double counting and this may 
distort managerial incentives. For example, given the option of either capitalising or 
distributing this double-counted income many managers may choose to distribute. This 
may lead to an µDFTXLUH and GLVWULEXWH¶ strategy which displaces other investment-led, 
productivity-focused sources of shareholder value creation. Hence, even if an 
acquisition has productive diseconomies, it may have benefits in terms of improving 
PDQDJHPHQWV¶ capacity to distribute. Remuneration structures tied to shareholder 
value measures or measures that underpin the creation of shareholder value may 
exacerbate this problem. 
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In both cases there is little indication of successful investment likely to result in 
increased productivity, and unsurprisingly it was not delivered. Water companies 
invested more: it may explain their slightly better productivity performance, but other 
factors ± such as the pricing regime - may play a role (see Leaver forthcoming). Within 
the pharmaceutical sector the overall levels of investment per employee also fell (see 
below). 
 
 
Table 12: Raw data ± Turnover to tangible assets 
 
 
 
Table 13: Raw data - real intangible assets per employee 
 
 
 
Table 14: Raw data ± Turnover to intangible assets 
 
 
 
Table 15: Raw data ± EBITDA to intangible assets 
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Table 16: Raw data ± EBITDA to tangible and intangible assets 
 
 
 
c. Distributions & Financial Stress 
 
Our distributions analysis describes those measures that might indicate whether 
shareholder distributions are excessive relative to underlying operating performance. It 
is also, therefore, also a measure of financial stress. Overly generous distributions to 
shareholders may expose creditors and other stakeholders to the risk of impairments 
or bankruptcy. Table 17 presents indicative trend data on a series of measures. 
 
Table 17: Trend data - Distributions & financial stress  
 
 
 
Source: $XWKRU¶V calculations based on financial statements ending in the years noted for the entities 
noted 
Note: available earnings here are calculated as retained earnings from the previous year plus net profit 
after tax from the current year. 
Note: on the dividend figures above a low figure is again a measure of undesirability ± hence on 
µGLYLGHQGV to net profit ratio ± group DFFRXQWV¶ a score of 2/7 for AZN means that in 5 years out of 7, the 
ratio increased. 
 
Table 18 shows that the ratio of dividends paid to group net profit for all pharma 
companies are higher in 2018 than in 2011, and that the growth in dividends relative to 
group profit increases steadily across those years. Water companies show a slightly 
more uneven trend: 3HQQRQ¶V dividends to group net profit grow steadily to 2017 only 
to fall back to a level just above the 2011 figure in 2018. United Utilities and 6HYHUQ¶V 
dividends to group net profit figure fluctuate throughout the period studied, but end 
2018 marginally below 2011 figures. 
 
Importantly, AZN distributes dividends in excess of group net profit in 6 of the 8 years 
in our sample. GSK do the same in 3 of the 8 years in our sample (table 18). Table 19 
shows that dividends to group earnings are increasing for AZN. More spectacularly 
Cost of financing ratios
Dividend to 
net profit 
ratio - group 
accounts
Ratio of 
dividends to 
available 
group 
earnings
Ratio of 
dividends to 
available 
parent 
earnings
Interest to 
EBIT ratio
Ratio of 
interest cost 
to borrowing 
as per group 
accounts
Gearing ratio 
(Debt to 
equity)
Ratio of 
dividends 
and interest 
costs to 
wage cost Average Ranking data
% % % % % % % %
AstraZeneca plc 2/7 0/7 3/7 1/7 6/7 0/7 3/7 2.2/7 2
GlaxoSmithKline plc 4/7 3/7 3/7 4/7 4/7 2/7 4/7 3.4/7 3
Hikma Pharmaceuticals plc 3/7 2/7 3/7 3/7 3/7 3/7 1/7 2.6/7 2
Total pharmaceuticals 3/7 1.7/7 3/7 2.7/7 4.3/7 1.7/7 2.7/7 2.7/7 2
Pennon Group plc 3/6 4/6 4/6 3/6 2/6 5/6 3/6 4/7 4
United Utilities Group plc 3/7 3/7 2/7 4/7 4/7 4/7 5/7 3.6/7 4
Severn Trent pc 3/7 3/7 3/7 4/7 4/7 3/7 3/7 3.3/7 3
Total water companies 3.2/7 3.5/7 3.2/7% 3.9/7 3.5/7 4.2/7 3.9/7 3.6/7 4
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they show that in 2016-18 GSK had negative earnings at group level, but continued to 
pay out dividends of £12.7bn. This was only possible because, as noted in section 3i, 
the legal limit of dividend distributions is the distributable reserves of the parent 
company not the group, which are ordinarily interpreted as the SDUHQW¶V µUHWDLQHG 
HDUQLQJV¶ Table 20 shows a significant discrepancy between group and parent figures 
at GSK. GSK has relatively high earnings at parent level, which allows it to continue to 
pay large amounts of dividends (table 20). There are many reasons why there might 
be discrepancies between group and parent (for example if the parent is trading and 
generates its own profit), but it may ± as both PIRC and the FSA recognise ± be a 
signal that the holding value of parent subsidiaries are over-estimated, leading to an 
over-statement of distributable reserves (Bouvier 2019). 
 
 
Table 18: Raw data ± Dividends to current net profit ratio 
 
 
 
Table 19: Raw data ± Dividends to available group earnings ratio 
 
 
 
Table 20: Raw data ± Dividends to available parent company earnings ratio 
 
 
 
Another indicator of financial stress ± or at least financial risk ± is the gearing ratio. A 
general rule of thumb for high R&D firms like pharma is that a debt-to-equity ratio of 
2:1 is the norm (Gallo 2015). $VWUD=HQHFD¶V debt-equity ratio is well below this, but 
does almost triple during our sample period. GSK is well above that norm, quadrupling 
its debt-equity ratio between 2011-2018, ending with a ratio of 7:1. Water companies 
have always been relatively highly levered because they are quasi-monopolies with a 
guaranteed price and customer base which makes it less risky to borrow against those 
future income streams. A ratio of 2-2.5x debt-equity is therefore probably not as risky 
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(particularly with their under-exposure to goodwill impairment risks); although 6HYHUQ¶V 
increase to 5.6x by 2018 may be cause for concern.  
 
Table 21: Raw data ± Gearing ratio 
 
 
 
Note: debt here = short term + long term debt 
 
Finally, one explanation of productivity decline is that of growing inequality (Berg & 
Ostry 2011). One driver of that inequality may be that a greater proportion of internally 
generated funds are being distributed to capital rather than labour (see Piketty & 
Goldhammer 2014). Table 22 shows the relatively high costs of capital relative to 
wages in all firms. Costs are higher in water companies due to their higher leverage 
and reliance on debt funding, with companies like United Utilities paying out over twice 
as much in interest and dividends than it does in wages. Even a pharmaceutical 
company like AZN who we might think would need to pay a premium to retain a high-
skilled workforce, pays out almost as much in interest and dividends as it does in 
wages. It is also worth noting that this high payout to capital is happening at a time 
when interest rates are very low.  
 
Table 22: Raw data: Dividends to wage costs ratio 
 
 
 
 
This analysis of distributions offers an alternative reading of the relationship between 
the costs of capital and productivity slowdown: if liabilities are taken on to finance 
acquisitions, then there are two implications. First, this will lead to a growing amount of 
goodwill on firm balance sheets which is not amortised but does carry an impairment 
risk. The absence of amortisation and the discretion management appears to have 
over the impairment decision, shores up the net asset position of the group and 
diminishes pressure on the parent to impair the holding value of its subsidiaries. That 
acts both as a support for its distributable reserves, and an incentive for further M&A 
activity. It also creates a double standard relative to those firms who try to grow 
organically, but cannot realise any µLQWHUQDOO\ JHQHUDWHG¶ goodwill (see Haskel & 
Westlake 2017). In a sense, then, the goodwill rules incentivise M&A which may 
benefit them in terms of financial engineering possibilities, but may make no sense in 
terms of building internal competences organically which improve productivity.  
Ratio of dividends and interest costs to wage cost 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Average
AstraZeneca plc 92.3% 99.3% 101.9% 94.6% 98.1% 104.6% 98.2% 88.7% 97.2%
GlaxoSmithKline plc 77.5% 77.7% 70.0% 76.6% 73.8% 86.3% 75.2% 64.5% 75.2%
Hikma Pharmaceuticals plc 27.3% 29.0% 33.5% 36.8% 47.8% 52.8% 21.2% 46.5% 36.9%
Total pharmaceuticals 65.7% 68.7% 68.5% 69.3% 73.2% 81.2% 64.9% 66.6% 69.8%
Pennon Group plc 108.0% 88.8% 91.8% 76.3% 108.9% 139.5% 119.5% 104.7%
United Utilities Group plc 273.7% 266.7% 252.0% 160.4% 273.3% 224.6% 205.6% 214.6% 233.9%
Severn Trent pc 155.1% 176.8% 215.5% 129.3% 150.7% 143.0% 180.4% 175.2% 165.7%
Total water companies 214.4% 183.8% 185.4% 127.2% 166.8% 158.8% 175.2% 169.8% 172.7%
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In this sense, managers may switch their efforts away from the µdifficult VWXII¶ of 
exercising skill and judgement in the selection of investment opportunities or improving 
technique, to the simpler, lower-risk practice of buying corporate assets which add 
financial engineering opportunities. 
 
d. Reliability of financial reporting  
 
The above point about financial engineering can be understood by examining the 
prevalence of assets of uncertain value on our sample FRPSDQLHV¶ balance sheets. 
The ratios of uncertain assets to total assets and uncertain liabilities to total liabilities 
are shown in table 23. 
 
Table 23: Raw data± Ratios of uncertain assets to total assets, uncertain 
liabilities to total liabilities and uncertain net assets to total net assets  
 
 
 
Source: $XWKRU¶V calculations based on financial statements ending in the years noted for the entities 
noted 
Note µ8QFHUWDLQ net assets to total net DVVHWV¶ is calculated as (uncertain assets ± uncertain 
liabilities)/net assets 
 
As table 23 shows, uncertain assets are inconsequential in the water companies 
surveyed. They amount to little more than small deferred tax balances and other small 
items. In contrast such assets are significant on the balance sheets of pharmaceutical 
companies. Liabilities of uncertain value are broadly similar across pharma and water 
companies. The third row shows uncertain net assets to reported net assets, 
calculated as µXQFHUWDLQ assets ± uncertain liabilities)/reported net DVVHWV¶ In the two 
large pharmaceutical firms, the value of uncertain net assets substantially exceed total 
net assets. In effect this means that the balance sheet position of AZN and GSK are 
Uncertain assets to total assets 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Average
AstraZeneca plc 42.3% 51.3% 48.7% 57.6% 59.4% 64.5% 63.5% 59.4% 55.8%
GlaxoSmithKline plc 35.1% 40.8% 37.0% 36.2% 46.3% 49.3% 48.1% 46.3% 42.4%
Hikma Pharmaceuticals plc 28.2% 27.7% 27.6% 29.7% 26.1% 43.3% 27.2% 25.5% 29.4%
Total pharmaceuticals 35.2% 39.9% 37.8% 41.2% 43.9% 52.4% 46.2% 43.7% 42.5%
Pennon Group plc 7.6% 7.1% 6.8% 6.3% 6.8% 6.5% 7.4% 6.9%
United Utilities Group plc 1.1% 0.9% 1.0% 1.1% 1.3% 1.4% 1.5% 1.5% 1.2%
Severn Trent pc 2.7% 2.1% 1.8% 1.2% 1.2% 1.0% 1.8% 1.6% 1.7%
Total water companies 1.9% 3.6% 3.3% 3.1% 2.9% 3.1% 3.3% 3.5% 3.1%
Uncertain liabilities to total liabilities 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Average
AstraZeneca plc 24.8% 20.9% 19.8% 15.1% 14.3% 16.8% 17.3% 14.4% 17.9%
GlaxoSmithKline plc 23.9% 16.0% 13.3% 15.8% 15.0% 14.3% 11.9% 10.7% 15.1%
Hikma Pharmaceuticals plc 4.4% 4.3% 5.1% 4.9% 3.9% 2.2% 4.0% 2.2% 3.9%
Total pharmaceuticals 17.7% 13.8% 12.8% 11.9% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 9.1% 12.3%
Pennon Group plc 15.3% 16.7% 14.4% 14.5% 14.1% 13.5% 12.9% 14.5%
United Utilities Group plc 20.8% 18.2% 16.8% 16.2% 15.1% 14.6% 13.6% 12.2% 15.9%
Severn Trent pc 21.0% 22.0% 21.2% 18.7% 18.2% 15.9% 17.6% 16.4% 18.9%
Total water companies 20.9% 18.5% 18.2% 16.4% 16.0% 14.9% 14.9% 13.8% 16.7%
Uncertain net assets  to total net assets 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Average
AstraZeneca plc 64.2% 88.8% 89.2% 141.9% 160.9% 195.9% 193.1% 208.8% 142.8%
GlaxoSmithKline plc 75.7% 168.1% 141.0% 184.5% 203.5% 430.9% 573.8% 573.1% 293.8%
Hikma Pharmaceuticals plc 51.4% 52.0% 47.1% 50.8% 46.4% 76.7% 55.3% 50.2% 53.8%
Total pharmaceuticals 63.8% 103.0% 92.5% 125.7% 137.0% 234.5% 274.1% 277.4% 163.5%
Pennon Group plc -24.4% -26.1% -17.0% -18.4% -13.8% -13.9% -7.7% -17.3%
United Utilities Group plc -89.3% -80.0% -70.8% -55.4% -49.2% -43.5% -39.7% -34.7% -57.8%
Severn Trent pc -105.7% -134.5% -163.7% -108.0% -169.4% -107.8% -137.1% -123.5% -131.2%
Total water companies -97.5% -79.6% -86.9% -60.1% -79.0% -55.0% -63.5% -55.3% -72.1%
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heavily dependent on assets where substantial management judgement is involved in 
any valuation process.  
 
Another concern is highlighted in table 24. These ratios show that in the cases of AZN 
and GSK the value of the parent FRPSDQLHV¶ net assets are growing in proportion to 
their JURXSV¶ net assets. It also shows that in all of our cases the value of the parent 
company exceeds that of that of their respective groups, although the growth is most 
marked in the two largest pharmaceutical companies and Severn Trent, repeating a 
trend observed above. The patterns of retained earnings are difficult to interpret 
because, as previously noted, GSK have negative retained earnings at group level 
from 2014 onwards but positive retained earnings at a parent company level, leading 
to a negative result in table 24. But the implication is clear: there is a large divergence 
between the retained earnings position of group and parent.  
 
Table 24: Raw data ± ratios of parent company net assets to group net assets 
and parent company retained earnings to group retained earnings 
 
 
 
 
Source: $XWKRU¶V calculations based on financial statements ending in the years noted for the entities 
noted 
 
  
Ratio of parent company net assets to group net assets 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Average
AstraZeneca plc 57.1% 91.7% 107.3% 123.1% 121.8% 136.2% 133.9% 135.5% 113.3%
GlaxoSmithKline plc 261.6% 402.6% 288.4% 582.8% 288.6% 428.2% 768.7% 652.9% 459.2%
Hikma Pharmaceuticals plc 138.8% 199.6% 163.9% 165.2% 154.8% 131.1% 203.9% 179.0% 167.0%
Total pharmaceuticals 152.5% 231.3% 186.5% 290.4% 188.4% 231.9% 368.8% 322.4% 246.5%
Pennon Group plc 106.1% 120.2% 114.6% 127.5% 120.7% 121.3% 118.5% 118.4%
United Utilities Group plc 246.1% 220.7% 217.6% 183.3% 195.9% 175.3% 167.4% 159.2% 195.7%
Severn Trent pc 255.2% 373.8% 397.5% 320.2% 440.6% 342.5% 377.2% 349.3% 357.0%
Total water companies 250.6% 233.6% 245.1% 206.0% 254.7% 212.8% 222.0% 209.0% 229.2%
Ratio of parent company retained earnings to group retained earnings 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Average
AstraZeneca plc 38.4% 84.0% 104.1% 128.2% 128.0% 188.0% 180.9% 204.2% 132.0%
GlaxoSmithKline plc 554.6% 3435.7% 1881.6% -1121.1% -1434.0% -288.2% -341.3% -847.8% 229.9%
Hikma Pharmaceuticals plc 171.2% 265.7% 196.3% 192.1% 174.0% 136.8% 75.9% 61.4% 159.2%
Total pharmaceuticals 254.7% 1261.8% 727.3% -266.9% -377.3% 12.2% -28.2% -194.1% 173.7%
Pennon Group plc 109.7% 145.9% 129.0% 158.7% 146.2% 146.9% 137.7% 139.1%
United Utilities Group plc 375.5% 303.1% 286.7% 205.4% 200.6% 170.6% 159.9% 149.2% 231.4%
Severn Trent pc 730.3% 1244.4% 656.8% 450.5% 893.5% 533.0% 654.8% 539.8% 712.9%
Total water companies 552.9% 552.4% 363.1% 261.6% 417.6% 283.3% 320.5% 275.5% 378.4%
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One way of exploring this relation more fully is to examine how the value of the 
investment in subsidiary companies on the parent company balance sheet compares 
with the net asset value of the group. This is shown in table 25 
 
 
Table 25: Raw data ± Ratio of parent company value of investment in subsidiary 
to net asset value of the group 
 
 
 
 
Source: $XWKRU¶V calculations based on financial statements ending in the years noted for the entities 
noted 
 
What the data shows is that the value of the subsidiaries reported in the parent 
company accounts is increasing against the valuation of net assets of the group. And 
again, the most significant growth over this period is at AZN and GSK; although all 
companies show that subsidiary valuations on the parent balance sheet are much 
higher than group net assets, with the exception of Pennon. If the value of the 
investment in subsidiaries was reduced to reflect the value of their assets, marked to 
value (as International Financial Reporting Standard requires, albeit without upward 
goodwill revaluation) on the group balance sheet then the value of reserves in the 
parent company accounts of all these groups of companies would be significantly 
impaired. The consequence would be a substantial reduction in the available reserves 
in those parent companies. Table 26 presents this counterfactual calculation: it 
provides an indication of the impairment required to equate the values of the 
investment in subsidiary companies with the net asset values of their groups. 
 
Table 26: Raw data - Value of impairment required to restate the cost of 
investment in subsidiary companies at net asset worth 
 
 
 
Source: $XWKRU¶V calculations based on financial statements ending in the years noted for the entities 
noted 
 
Note that the figures for AstraZeneca and Hikma are in US dollars and as such totals 
are not calculated. 
 
Ratio of parent company value of investment in subsidiaries to net 
asset value of group 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Average
AstraZeneca plc 99.8% 105.9% 117.3% 139.6% 162.3% 182.7% 189.2% 236.7% 154.2%
GlaxoSmithKline plc 223.0% 291.8% 252.1% 398.9% 226.4% 407.7% 558.8% 544.3% 362.9%
Hikma Pharmaceuticals plc 208.4% 197.9% 162.3% 167.2% 139.6% 131.9% 217.5% 196.1% 177.6%
Total pharmaceuticals 177.0% 198.5% 177.2% 235.2% 176.1% 240.8% 321.8% 325.7% 231.6%
Pennon Group plc 142.6% 124.3% 110.5% 112.5% 109.5% 107.6% 120.9% 118.3%
United Utilities Group plc 333.7% 317.3% 299.1% 252.7% 260.0% 233.9% 224.3% 214.4% 266.9%
Severn Trent pc 321.0% 370.8% 431.5% 345.2% 488.9% 374.4% 360.2% 335.0% 378.4%
Total water companies 327.4% 276.9% 285.0% 236.1% 287.2% 239.2% 230.7% 223.4% 263.2%
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The impact of this impairment on parent company retained earnings, which would be 
restated if these sums were provided would then leave them as stated in Table 27. 
 
Table 27: Raw data ± Value of parent company retained earnings if impairment 
as made of subsidiary cost to reflect group net asset value 
 
 
 
Source: $XWKRU¶V calculations based on financial statements ending in the years noted for the entities 
noted 
 
It is a legal requirement that a company have retained realised earnings before it may 
make a distribution to its shareholders by way of dividend. This data suggests that if 
the provisions noted were made then neither United Utilities or Severn Trent would 
have been capable of making dividend payments during this period whilst AstraZeneca 
and Hikma joining them in this situation by 2018 and with GSK trending in that same 
direction.  Only Pennon appears to have no issue to address. The impact of judgement 
in the valuation of assets of inherently uncertain value is demonstrated in that case. 
 
The same question of reliability of the reporting of accounting data and associated 
issues in the case of taxation related matters. Table 28 provides a summary of the 
heuristic reporting on this issue. 
 
Table 28: Trend data ± Tax quality ratios  
 
 
Source: $XWKRU¶V calculations based on financial statements ending in the years noted for the entities 
noted 
 
As with the heuristic reporting for accounting uncertainty it is apparent that this tax 
reporting will require refinement before it is generically useful. The underlying data 
better explains what is happening in these cases. 
 
Tax ratios 
Ratio of 
current tax 
paid against 
expectation
Ratio of 
restated tax 
in net 
current tax 
liability
Total 
deferred tax 
savings per 
annum Average Ranking data
% % % %
AstraZeneca plc 5/7 3/7 3/7 3.6/7 4
GlaxoSmithKline plc 4/7 2/7 3/7 3/7 3
Hikma Pharmaceuticals plc 5/7 3/7 2/7 3.4/7 3
Total pharmaceuticals 4.7/7 2.7/7 2.7/7 3.4/7 3
Pennon Group plc 1/6 3/6 2/6 2/6 2
United Utilities Group plc 3/7 3/7 4/7 3.4/7 3
Severn Trent pc 4/7 5/7 4/7 4.3/7 5
Total water companies 2.8/7 3.9/7 3.5/7 3.4/7 3
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Three tests have been undertaken. The first concerned the difference between the 
current tax rate declared by the company for a period and the headline rate of tax for 
that period. The ratio in Table 29 is that of the declared rate to expected rate and not 
of the declared tax rate.  
 
Table 29: Trend data ± Ratio of current tax paid against expectation 
 
 
 
Source: $XWKRU¶V calculations based on financial statements ending in the years noted for the entities 
noted 
 
Rather surprisingly the current tax rates paid by pharmaceutical companies during the 
period are at, or usually exceed, the expected rate of tax due on declared profits. 
Without more analysis this cannot be explained in depth, but one likely explanation is 
the increased focus on the enforcement of transfer pricing rules during the course of 
this period which has had particular impact on pharmaceutical companies. It is also 
explained by the relatively low rate of spending on tangible assets in proportion to 
activity in these companies when compared with that on intangible assets, which 
usually attracts lower rates of tax relief. In contrast the water companies generally paid 
rates of tax lower than those expected as indicated by headline tax rates. This is 
explained by the generous capital allowance regime on capital spending that these 
companies tend to enjoy.  
 
This comparison of headline rates of tax with actual tax rates paid does not, however, 
provide a good indication of the quality of the tax accounting of these companies. It 
does, instead, indicate the differing ways in which the tax regime tends to treat their 
expenditure profiles. A better view of the quality of their tax accounting is provide by a 
check of the legal requirements concerning UK tax reporting which requires that a 
company split disclosure of its tax liabilities between those due for the current period 
and these due in respect of prior periods. It was argued by Deloitte (2009), who are 
one of the Big 4 firms of accountants that dominate the supply of auditing and other 
related services, that the reported adjustments to prior year liabilities were the best 
indicator of successful tax avoidance by large companies. If that is the case then most 
of these companies are, most of the time, reporting successful tax avoidance since as 
Table 30 shows, most adjustments are negative i.e. a reduction in previously reported 
liabilities is disclosed, meaning sums actually paid are less than previously reported, 
which Deloitte interpreted to mean that tax avoidance had succeeded in its objectives. 
It should be noted that some companies e.g. GSK in 2011-13 and United Utilities in 
2011-12 did not report this data.  
  
Ratio of current tax paid against expectation
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Average
AstraZeneca plc 79.0% 89.5% 184.0% 325.5% 100.6% 52.1% 88.2% 197.8% 139.6%
GlaxoSmithKline plc 102.3% 104.1% 100.2% 116.3% 119.2% 365.7% 238.6% 128.1% 159.3%
Hikma Pharmaceuticals plc 56.2% 108.2% 177.5% 93.8% 102.8% 278.6% -21.1% 51.7% 106.0%
Total pharmaceuticals 79.2% 100.6% 153.9% 178.5% 107.5% 232.1% 101.9% 125.9% 135.0%
Pennon Group plc 64.1% 552.4% 102.6% 99.0% 75.1% 74.0% 46.0% 144.8%
United Utilities Group plc 40.4% 67.1% 102.0% -55.5% 67.1% 62.2% 37.6% 14.6% 41.9%
Severn Trent plc 47.7% 156.0% -28.0% -3.3% 125.2% 85.4% 31.7% 57.5% 59.0%
Total water companies 44.1% 95.7% 208.8% 14.6% 97.1% 74.3% 47.8% 39.4% 77.7%
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Table 30 ± Ratio of restated tax in net current tax liability 
 
 
 
Source: $XWKRU¶V calculations based on financial statements ending in the years noted for the entities 
noted 
 
The scale of these restatements, which are almost invariably material within the 
context of the tax reporting of the companies who disclose this data, suggest that there 
is either significant tax avoidance taking place in these companies or that the quality of 
their PDQDJHPHQW¶V judgement on the provisions to be made is materially incorrect, 
which is significant in the context of this research. 
 
 
The tax liability of a company is not solely comprised of its current tax due. 
Transactions can arise in the current period that might not give rise to a current tax 
liability or saving, but which might do so in years to come. These are accounted for 
through the mechanism of deferred taxation, which can give rise to reported assets 
(reflecting a future tax saving that the reporting entity is confident of recovering) and 
liabilities, being tax due at some time in the future as a result of current or past 
activities of the company. Although all deferred tax liabilities are meant to be recorded 
as such, deferred tax assets are subject to considerable discretion on the part of 
management as to whether they are accounted for or not. There is also substantial 
uncertainty inherent in all deferred tax accounting because it is not known when, or 
why, or at what tax rate many of the potential assets and liabilities might be realised. 
They are, then, in many ways the archetypal asset of uncertain value, not least 
because the asset is invariably unsaleable, and the liability is uncertain if the entity 
ceases to be a going concern.  
 
During the period subject to survey the UK corporation tax rate fell from 26% in 2011 
to 19% in 2018. Table 31 notes the approximate savings arising to the companies 
surveyed during this period as a result of restatement of their deferred tax liabilities to 
reflect falling corporation tax rates at which any potential liabilities might fall due, much 
(but not all) of which will arise for this reason. Hikma and AstraZeneca data is stated in 
86¶P the rest in 8.¶P 
 
  
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Average
AstraZeneca plc -4.0% -4.7% 3.3% -12.5% -63.8% -3.8% -75.9% 5.1% -19.5%
GlaxoSmithKline plc 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -77.0% -19.8% -10.5% -31.4% -42.1% -22.6%
Hikma Pharmaceuticals plc -14.3% 14.3% 0.0% -12.3% -1.5% 1.7% 0.0% 0.0% -1.5%
Total pharmaceuticals -6.1% 3.2% 1.1% -33.9% -28.4% -4.2% -35.8% -12.3% -14.5%
Pennon Group plc -1.6% -39.3% -48.6% -15.0% -3.2% 6.7% -156.5% -36.8%
United Utilities Group plc 0.0% 0.0% -9.5% 216.9% -21.3% -20.5% -71.9% -55.8% 4.8%
Severn Trent plc -106.3% -15.0% 223.1% 2450.0% -21.1% -5.5% -135.0% -12.1% 297.3%
Total water companies -53.1% -5.5% 58.1% 872.8% -19.1% -9.7% -66.7% -74.8% 87.7%
  
 
 30 
Table 31 ± Total deferred tax credits arising  
 
 
 
Source: $XWKRU¶V calculations based on financial statements ending in the years noted 
for the entities noted 
 
The total savings in the case of GSK, for example, exceeded £2.3 billion and the water 
companies saved an average exceeding £250 billion each. The reward to deferring tax 
liabilities was, in that case, quite considerable and had a significant effect on post tax 
earnings in these companies.  
 
  
Total deferred tax savings per annum 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Average
Note - negative number is a saving
AstraZeneca plc (240) (301) (702) (861) (390) (224) (1,019) (806) (568)
GlaxoSmithKline plc 154 242 (530) (605) (418) (541) (263) (414) (297)
Hikma Pharmaceuticals plc (4) (10) (41) 7 (3) (65) 71 (20) (8)
Total pharmaceuticals (30) (23) (424) (486) (270) (277) (404) (413) (291)
Pennon Group plc 0 (3) (33) (34) 15 7 0 18 (4)
United Utilities Group plc (62) (77) (50) (129) 23 (88) (23) 66 (43)
Severn Trent pc (54) (78) (6) (150) (5) (65) (13) 29 (43)
Total water companies (58) (53) (30) (104) 11 (49) (12) 38 (32)
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An index of findings 
 
An objective of this research was to determine whether it was possible to create a 
ranking of the companies surveyed to assist those asking whether there were key 
concerns within companies on productivity, financial engineering and the quality of the 
financial data each reported. The basis for providing an overall score for each activity 
has already been noted. It seems very unlikely that at present this can be applied to 
the tax data, for reasons already noted. For the other reviews undertaken the results 
are shown by Table 32. 
 
Table 32 ± Overall rankings of surveyed companies 
 
 
 
Source: $XWKRU¶V calculations  
 
There remain doubts, again for reasons noted, whether the accounting quality data 
supports this ranking. In the other areas noted the data seems considerably more 
robust. 
 
The ranking does not produce the outcome based on financial performance alone, 
although there are similarities in the trends noted. 
 
More research is required into this area, and a more sophisticated approach s almost 
certainly required, most especially if reliable rankings on quality issues are to be 
produced. It is, however, felt that the approach shows promise and justifies more 
research to indicate: 
 
a. Which of the measures used are most appropriate as indicators of risk; 
b. Whether other measures need to be considered; 
c. Whether and how scale can be added into the measurement process; 
d. Whether the findings translate to other sectors; 
e. Whether users find the resulting indicators useful. 
 
2. Report Summary & Discussion 
 
This research sought to identify whether indicators of financialization derived from the 
annual reports of six companies in two sectors (pharmaceuticals and water) co-incide 
with weak productivity performance. We use the term µFR-LQFLGHQFH¶ deliberately 
because establishing causation conclusively would require research that could shed 
Overall rankings
Financial 
performance 
ranking 
Employee 
productivity
Financial 
productivity
Cost of 
financing
Accounting 
quality
Overall 
ranking
AstraZeneca plc 1                         1                         2                         2                         2                         1.60                 
GlaxoSmithKline plc 3                         3                         3                         3                         4                         3.20                 
Hikma Pharmaceuticals plc 5                         4                         4                         2                         5                         4.00                 
Total pharmaceuticals 3                         3                         3                         2                         4                         3.00                 
Pennon Group plc 6                         4                         1                         4                         4                         3.80                 
United Utilities Group plc 4                         4                         3                         4                         5                         4.00                 
Severn Trent pc 3                         3                         4                         3                         5                         3.60                 
Total water companies 4                         4                         3                         4                         5                         4.00                 
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light on management motives. This caveat is important because it is not clear whether 
the use of financial engineering to create shareholder value µFURZG RXW¶ investment-led, 
productivity-oriented alternatives, or whether managers turn to financial engineering 
when those alternatives are exhausted; or indeed whether in this very small sample 
the coincidence is random. Nevertheless, this report does paint a worrying picture of 
performance in some of the 8.¶V largest and most prestigious firms which warrants 
some comment.  
 
Our results show that companies showing the weakest trends in terms of labour 
productivity coincided with the highest proportionate investment in assets of uncertain 
value where balance sheet valuation might be subject to the greatest degree of 
management discretion e.g. goodwill, intangible assets, derivatives and deferred tax 
assets. This was matched also by higher levels of liabilities of uncertain value e.g. 
deferred tax and pension liabilities. As a whole, the proportion of assets and liabilities 
of uncertain value rose across the sample over the period reviewed, but rose most 
notably as a proportion of group net asset values in companies with the weakest 
trends in productivity, where the value of those assets dominated the worth of these 
companies at the end of the period under review.  
 
One particular finding was the extent to which companies were taking advantage of 
the different reporting requirements for group and parent entities. The rules for single 
entity parent company accounting reflect the fact that as standalone entities parent 
companies may record their profits and losses and assets and liabilities on the basis of 
their own trading, which is usually focussed upon investment activity. Here, the 
impairment of assets is rarely required and profit is declared upon the basis of 
dividends received from subsidiary companies. This can be a decidedly selective 
process because only profitable subsidiaries pay such returns and the results of loss-
making activities are therefore excluded from view in this representation. However, 
when reporting as a group, a company must prepare consolidated accounts which net 
out all the profits and losses, assets and liabilities etc. The result is that parent 
companies operating as single entities tend to report much higher levels of retained 
profit than they do when reporting as group parent entities. This matters because it is 
the profits of parent companies as single entities that, controversially, determines their 
ability to pay dividends, even when the group accounts question their ability to do so. 
Our research suggests most of the companies were, to some degree, relying upon this 
mechanism to support their dividend payments but those by far the most likely to do so 
were those with the most worrying productivity trends. In other words, those 
companies most likely to be failing to achieve commercial returns were, nonetheless, 
maintaining their returns to shareholders by relying upon accounting mechanisms that 
might not fairly reflect the underlying overall performance of the group entities under 
the management and control of the parent entity. 
 
We also reviewed the quality of the financial reporting of these entities. This was 
based upon their apparent reliability of their tax disclosures, and adjustments made to 
them over time. Our provisional conclusion is that the quality of that reporting is 
declining, which might either indicate a greater use of tax avoidance, giving rise to a 
broad trend of increased revisions to past tax disclosures, or a genuine decline in the 
quality of tax estimates included in these accounts, which did however appear 
consistent and systemic in many cases over the period. This is important because a 
penny saved on tax is a penny available for distribution, which would again be 
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indicative of how the financialization of reporting provides opportunity for shareholder 
distributions. However, this finding is not conclusive and further research is required to 
confirm this more concretely.  
 
Based upon these findings we have suggested heuristic methods for recording these 
broad-based trends, doing so on the understanding that no one indicator will in itself 
be significant, most especially given the artificiality of all financial statements that 
impose time period reporting constraints on what are, in effect, ongoing streams of 
financial transactions. Our suggestion is that these heuristic approaches might be of 
considerable value for those looking for a number of key qualities in the companies in 
which they wish to invest. Those qualities are underlying profitability; the delivery of 
returns on investment in productive assets, and financial resilience as indicated by 
having balance sheets that are as free from subjective judgment capable of disguising 
a lack of resilience. In an era when analysis of company data is declining as a result of 
the increasing cost of undertaking that activity that cannot usually be passed onto 
clients as a result of the constraints imposed by the European 8QLRQ¶V MIFID II 
directive2 the measures that we have identified might be of considerable value. On that 
basis we welcome the opportunity to undertake further research on this issue.  
 
Close up on pharma 
 
The most worrying trends in our results can be found in our two large pharmaceutical 
firms: AstraZeneca (AZN) and GlaxoSmithkline (GSK).  
 
For AZN, between 2011-2018:  
 
x on financial performance, real EBITDA fell by around three fifths, real net assets halved 
and ROCE fell by three quarters 
x on productivity, real EBITDA per employee fell by nearly two thirds and EBITDA to total 
assets fell by around the same. 
x on distributions, the firm paid out dividends in excess of its group net profit in six of the 
eight years in our study, although dividends as a percentage of available group and 
parent earnings were much lower. 
x on reporting reliability, uncertain assets to total assets were higher than for any 
company in our sample in 2018, and that part of that valuation at least explain the large 
amounts of available earnings at group and company level; also the parent company 
value of their investment in subsidiaries was over twice that of group net assets in 2018 
± it is not clear what explains this discrepancy. 
 
For GSK between 2011-2018: 
 
x on financial performance, real EBITDA fell by over a third and real net assets by two 
thirds; ROCE nearly halved. 
x on productivity, real EBITDA per employee fell by a third and EBITDA to total assets 
halved. 
                                                 
2
 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/markets-financial-instruments-mifid-ii-directive-2014-65-eu_en 
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x on distributions, GSK paid out dividends in excess of its group net profit in three of the 
eight years in our study, but more worryingly its dividends were in excess of its 
available group earnings from 2016-2018, although its dividends to available parent 
earnings were much lower. 
x on reporting reliability, uncertain assets to total assets were the second highest next to 
AZN, whilst net uncertain assets to total net assets were higher than any firm in our 
sample; the discrepancy between dividends as a percentage of group and parent 
available earnings can be explained by the significant difference between reported 
group and parent available earnings. Also, the parent company value of their 
investment in subsidiaries was over five times that of reported group net assets in 2018 
 
These findings may seem to challenge prevailing narratives about UK pharma as 
national champions - R&D powerhouses and drivers of UK productivity. This analysis 
presents a rather different picture ± one where they certainly distribute a lot of money 
to shareholders, but do so on an increasingly flimsy operating base using assets which 
are increasingly intangible, and GRQ¶W appear to be improving the underlying 
productivity of each firm. Distributions are hollowing out group but not parent retained 
earnings and net assets, leading to a divergence in the reported positions of those two 
entities (see close up on GSK below). If the lessons of other firms, like Thomas Cook 
and Interserve are anything to go by, that divergence may eventually need to be 
reconciled, and that reconciliation may be costly and, in the worst cases, destabilising.  
 
These companies do, however, remain powerful actors within the pharmaceutical 
sector and maintain an effective gatekeeper position in final markets due to their 
extensive marketing operations. The question is whether high shareholder distributing, 
but declining productivity-enhancing, behemoths like AZN and GSK crowd out 
younger, more nimble firms in the sector such as Hikma - a smaller LSE-listed 
company, who fared much better on growth, performance and productivity indicators in 
our sample. Answering this question may lend support to 6FKQHLGHU¶V (2018) finding 
that the UK productivity puzzle is located in the practices of larger incumbents. We 
would add, that if the size of those incumbents blocks the development of newer, 
nimbler, more innovative entrants, then the productivity gap between the UK and 
competitor countries will endure.  
 
UK LQFXPEHQWV¶ productivity underperformance may reflect the 8.¶V more shareholder 
value focused business culture and corporate governance systems. This may allow 
relatively unproductive incumbents to survive for longer if they use financial 
engineering to maintain high shareholder distributions, which would position them 
more favourably with capital providers relative to smaller competitors. Getting to the 
root of that culture would require research on the career background of UK company 
boards, particularly the role of the Big 4 accounting firms as a training ground for the 
UK officer class. The role of the Big 4 in shaping board-level skills and norms may 
explain why financial engineering rather than investment-led, productivity-oriented 
solutions are sought at board level. This could add a different dimension to Bloom and 
Van 5HHQHQ¶V (2010) findings about the weak performance of UK management 
relatively. 
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Close up on GSK 
 
The reporting at GSK requires a bit more exploration. Zooming in on distributions by 
adding share buybacks, we see that between 2011-2018 GSK distributed over £7bn 
more in dividends and share buybacks than it generated in comprehensive group 
income for the year (table 33). This (in part) explains the hollowing out of retained 
earnings at group level over that period ± they are distributing more than they earn, 
hence retained earnings are exhausted. But, as noted in section 3iii ± it is the 
distributable reserves (retained earnings) of the parent not the group which 
determine what can legally be distributed. And here there is a large discrepancy 
between group and parent retained earnings (table 34). There are reasonable 
explanations for this ± for example if the parent has received interest or dividends 
from its subsidiaries in the past, which now put the parent retained earnings in net 
surplus and its subsidiaries retained earnings in net deficit. The auditor can 
presumably explain how the SDUHQW¶V subsidiaries were able to do this without 
breaching the 2006 Companies Act.   
 
Table 33: GSK ± Difference between group comprehensive income for the 
year and shareholder distributions (nominal) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 34: GSK ± Difference between group and parent retained earnings at 
end of year (real) 
 
 
 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total 2011-2018
Total Comprehensive Income For The Year 4292 3834 5752 1130 7902 1196 2431 3747 30284
Other Adjustments -117 -242 -297 -36 -3351 -341 663 4247 526
Dividends -3406 -3814 -3680 -3843 -3874 -4850 -3906 -3927 -31300
Share Buybacks -2191 -2493 -1504 -238 -6426
Total Distributions -5597 -6307 -5184 -4081 -3874 -4850 -3906 -3927 -37726
Difference between comprehensive income and dividends -1305 -2473 568 -2951 4028 -3654 -1475 -180 -7442
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Group retained earnings 3,370 652 913 (2,074) (1,397) (5,392) (6,477) (2,137)
Parent company retained earnings 18,689 22,401 17,179 23,251 20,033 15,538 22,106 18,117
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